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In the present study it was shown that decision heuristics and  confidence 
judgem ents play im portant roles in the building o f  preferences. Based on a duai- 
process account o f  thinking, the study com pared people who did well versus 
poorly on a  series o f  decision heuristics and overconfidence judgem ent tasks. The 
two groups were found to differ with regard to their inform ation search behaviour 
in introduced m ultiattribute choice tasks. High perform ers on the judgem ental 
tasks were less influenced in their decision processes by num erical inform ation 
form at (probabilities vs. frequencies) com pared to low  performers. They also looked 
at m ore attributes and spent m ore time on the m ultiattribute  choice tasks. The 
results reveal that perform ance on decision heuristics and  overconfidence tasks has 
a  bearing both  on heuristic and analytic processes in m ultiattribute decision 
m aking.
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THE FREQUENTIST APPROACH TO RATIONAL 
THOUGHT
There is a growing body of literature showing that frequentist representa­
tions cause various cognitive biases to disappear related to confidence 
judgements (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996) and to decision heuristics. Con­
fidence and frequency judgements allude to the broader concept of 
metacognition (for overviews, see Chambers, Izaute, & Marescaux, 2002; 
Metcalfe, 2000; Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994; Perfect & Schwartz, 2002; 
Yzerbyt, Lories, & Dardcnne, 1998). In a generic sense, metacognition 
designates our icnowlcdgc of our own knowledge and memory or, more 
specifically, the monitoring and control of the processes and outputs of our 
cognitions (Femandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000; Johansson, 2004; 
Nelson, 1996; Nelson & Narens, 1990).
It has been claimed by Gigercnzer (1991, 1993, 1994) that applying 
probability as any form of rational norm, in decision and judgemental 
research, may be considered controversial. The reason for this is that although 
probability may be looked upon as a subjective measure or belief, the concept 
of “probability” may also be interpreted as a series of long-run relative 
frequencies. This latter position implies, among other things, a refusal to assign 
probabilities to unique events. In several studies, Gigerenzcr has revealed how 
well-established judgemental errors may be eliminated if questions are asked in 
terms of frequencies rather than in terms of probabilities. In addition, he has 
shown that such judgemental errors may be avoided if a procedure of random 
sample is strictly applied (Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987).
However, there also exist research findings that do not support the 
frequentist perspective. For instance, it has recently been demonstrated that 
subjects who made confidencc judgements concerning unique events and 
subjects who estimated relative frequencies produced essentially the same 
responses (Brenner, Koehler, Liberman, & Tversky, 1996). In the same study, 
it was shown that both confidence judgements and frequency estimates 
exhibited substantial overconfidence, and that these measures were both 
highly correlated with independent judgements of representativeness (Bren­
ner et al., 1996). Still, it must be noted that only one type of decision 
heuristic was used in this study.
The role of frequencies and probabilities in confidencc judgements and 
decision heuristics has until now been the focus of much research. For 
instance, it has previously been revealed by Gigerenzcr that presentation 
mode of uncertainty has an impact on performance on confidence 
judgements and on decision heuristic tasks themselves.
However, little is yet known about how performance in these tasks 
governs to what degree people are sensitive to presentation format 
(frequencies/probabilities) in multiattribute choice. We therefore investigate
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if performance on judgemental tasks (such as decision heuristics and 
overconfidence tasks) has an influence on peoples’ sensitivity to probabil- 
ity-based or frequency-based presentation o f uncertainty in multiattribute 
choice tasks. The new feature of the present study is that a numerical 
presentation format is assumed also to play a role in multiattribute choice. 
More specifically, it is assumed that general performance on decision 
heuristic tasks and overconfidence tasks governs this influence.
Heuristic processes
Emphasising that performance on judgemental tasks should also matter to 
reasoning in multiattribute choice tasks, we build on recent dual-proccsscs 
accounts on thinking. Such accounts reveal that there exist individual 
differences in rational thought on quite a general basis (Evans & Over, 1996; 
Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 1997, 1998, 2000). These individual 
differences are particularly present in processes that arc characterised as fast, 
automatic, and largely unconscious to their nature (often referred to as 
Systeml processes). As a common feature, these processes are relatively 
undemanding of computational capacity. They are also considered rather 
personal and contextualised in that they take individual goals and pragmatic 
considerations into account. Based on these characteristics they are often 
termed heuristic. Deriving from a common process similarity in this respect 
(confidence vs. frequency judgements), it could be argued that performance 
on decision heuristics and confidcnce judgement tasks would have a bearing 
on performance on multiattribute choice tasks (Kahneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
The reason is that these judgement types share the same heuristic process 
specificity with the multiattribute choice tasks.
Wc thus hypothesise:
III. High performers on decision heuristic tasks and on overconfidence 
judgement tasks will be less influenced by the numerical presentation format 
(frequencies vs. probabilities) in multiattribute choice, than low performers 
on such tasks.
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Analytic processes
The other processes proposed by dual-process theorists (System2) arc 
considered as slower, strategic, and conscious to their nature (Evans & 
Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 1997, 1998, 2000). These 
processes pose higher demands on processing capacity and operate in an 
impersonal and decontextuahsed way, obeying logic or some other 
normative system. They arc therefore often labelled as analytic. The dual­
process theorists agree that Systeml processes have a huge influence on 
everyday judgement but that abstract and hypothetical System2 processes 
can guide our reasoning on specific tasks toward normative answers 
(Verschueren, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2004). Hence, high performers on 
heuristics tasks and overconfidence tasks are also assumed to use more 
accurate decision strategies in their decision processing (Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1993). This means that high performers on judgemental tasks to a 
higher extent arc supposed to use rational decision processes. Such processes 
display attention patterns that can be tied to systematic weighting and utility 
maximisation. Thus, it is also hypothesised that:
H2. High performers on decision heuristic tasks as well as on over- 
confidencc judgement tasks are expected to use more optimal decision 
strategies, compensatory in nature (characterised by a refusal to make 
tradeoffs), in multiattribute choice.
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PROCESS TRACING METHOD
In order to test the two proposed hypotheses, a  proccss tracing method was 
applied using eye tracking equipment. In this connection, attention-based 
latency time was used as a means of measuring the cognitive processes 
occurring in multiattribute choice tasks (see Lohse & Johnson, 1996). 
Compared with other more traditional process tracing methods like verbal 
protocols and information boards, eye tracking has in reccnt years received 
an increasing interest in, for instance, the organisational behaviour and 
marketing research fields.
METHOD
In the present study, participants were initially presented with 24 tasks 
measuring biases connected to the representativeness, availability, and 
anchoring and adjustment heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In 
addition, the tasks were designed to measure biases related to the use of the 
attribution heuristic (Pious, 1993). Each task was designed so that partici­
pants were first instructed to choose one of two options, knowing that one of 
the answers was correct and the other one incorrect. Subsequently, they were 
instructed to make a confidencc judgement on a half-range scale, indicating 
how sure they were of having chosen the correct answer (see, for example, 
Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; 
Oskamp, 1965). The main reason for adding the dimension of confidence to 
the fulfilment of the heuristic tasks was that it would add critical information 
about participants’ ability to carry out accurate judgements.
Based on the outcome of this test, it was possible to subdivide the 
participants according to their performance. High performers were char­
acterised by a low degree of biases with regard to the achievement on the 
heuristic tasks (availability, representativeness, anchoring and adjustment, 
attribution). Another feature was that they were also quite well calibrated. 
Low performers were on the other hand producing a high degree of biases on 
the heuristic test, and were also characterised by being not so well calibrated.
After having completed this initial paper and pencil block of tasks, 
participants were asked to perform a number o f computerised multiattribute 
preference tasks. A paper and pencil condition was also conducted for 
control purposes. All the tasks involved deciding about candidates for a job 
position, and the participants were asked to take the role of a consulting 
adviser for a company involved in personnel recruitment. In these tasks, 
uncertainty was either expressed in terms o f probabilities or in terms of 
frequencies. During the fulfilment of the tasks, both participants’ decision 
processes and their preferential outcomes were registered. A main question 
of interest was to determine whether participants performing well on the 
heuristics tasks would also behave more accurately than low performers in 
the fulfilment of the preference tasks.
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Participants
One hundred and ninety-two undergraduates (96 men and 96 women) at 
Göteborg University participated in the experiment in return for the equi­
valent of $7. These participants had on prior occasions indicated that they 
were willing to take part in the experiment. The mean age of the participants 
was 24.4 years (SD =3.6), which fell in range between 18 and 39 years.
Materials
All participants were first requested to complete a paper and pencil test 
booklet. It consisted of a diagnostic test measuring the degree of biases in 
different decision heuristics. The test booklet consisted of 24 questions. These 
questions were adopted from earlier research on heuristics and biases 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974, 1982). 
The 24 questions were divided into four decision heuristic categories 
dependent upon which decision heuristic they measured. Each of the four 
decision heuristic categories consisted of six questions. The four décision 
heuristic categories included in the booklet were representativeness, avail­
ability, attribution, or anchoring and adjustment. Each question always had 
one correct and one incorrect answer. Subsequent to having given an answer, 
participants were requested to give a confidence rating on a scale ranging
from 50 (making a guess) to 100 (absolutely sure) as to how sure they were 
that they had given the correct answer. The participants were then 
administered either a computerised version o f a job recruitment task or a 
paper and pencil version of the same task. The Eyegaze System (cf. Boe, 
Selart, & Takemura, 2000; Lohse & Johnson, 1996) eye tracking equipment 
was used together with the computerised version of the job recruitment task. 
Each scenario contained information about job  candidates expressed with 
reference to eight different attributes. Four o f these attributes concerned 
profit goals (e.g., improving the company’s production, share o f the market 
and profit, and increasing sales) (Cyert & March, 1963). The remaining four 
attributes were related to environmental goals (e.g., decreasing the company’s 
diluent level, improving the company’s working environment, environmental 
policy, and energy saving). An example of one of the four multiple event 
scenarios given to participants in the conditions with probability-based 
information can be found in the Appendix. The eight candidates’ ability to 
obtain these goals was for half of the participants expressed on a probability 
scale ranging from 1% to 100%. The other half of the participants were 
instead presented with information in terms of how frequent it was that the 
candidates would achieve the goals, for instance in 3 cases out of 10. All 
participants were given a total of eight different problems.
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Design
The design was mixed factorial with frcqucncy-based versus probabihty- 
based information as one of the between-subjects factors. A second bctween- 
subjects factor consisted of an experimental control condition measuring 
participants’ responsibility for their performance. A within-subjects factor 
(profit vs. environmental attributes) was used as a control variable with no 
connection to the hypotheses.
Procedure
Participants attended the experiment individually in laboratory conditions. 
They were seated in a private booth in front o f a computer screen and were 
requested to first fill out the test that measured the degree of biases in 
different decision heuristics. After having completed the test, participants 
were randomly assigned to either an eyc-gaze condition or a paper and 
pcncil version of the same task. For the participants in the cye-gaze 
condition, a calibration procedure was thoroughly performed so that the 
Eyegaze System could be used in the experiment. This calibration procedure 
usually took about 2 min for each new participant.
The participants were tlien given general instructions on how to perform 
the experiment. They were also instructed that their task in the experiment 
was to act as a job recruiter and that they had a variety of different 
organisations in trade and industry as their clients. Participants were told that 
their task was to make decisions about job candidates (in some cases groups 
of candidates). In this respect, it was made clear that their decisions were to be 
based on as thorough a judgement as possible. Participants were also 
instructed that the different candidates or groups of candidates would differ 
in the degree to which they could fulfil a certain company’s goal. The task in 
each situation was to select the best four candidates or groups of candidates 
for a post in an organisation. The participants were also informed that the 
four candidates they sclccted would continue to further interviews or analyses.
In the general instruction it was stressed that participants did not have to 
rank order the chosen alternatives. Moreover, participants were told that it 
did not matter in which order they were selected. All participants were 
explicitly instructed to carefully consider all information presented on the 
screen while making their choices.
After having considered the information they pressed the return button and 
typed in their choices. Thereafter, they pressed the return button again and 
another scenario was presented. Participants assigned to the paper and pencil 
version simply wrote down their choices on the bottom of each page before 
continuing to the next page. The different environmental or profit attributes as 
well as the positions of the different groups of candidates were randomised for 
cach scenario. Each participant also rcccived a randomised presentation of the 
scenarios. After having participated in the sessions, participants were 
debriefed and paid. The sessions lasted for approximately 50 min.
Measures
Measures o f  the heuristics tasks. The performance measure was con­
structed by summing the number of times the respondents answered 
correctly across the 24 different heuristic questions. The correct answers 
were coded as 1, and the incorrect as 0. If participants chose the correct 
answer, the corresponding confidence rating was treated as positive; 
otherwise it was coded as a negative value. An index measure of confidence 
was obtained by taking the mean values of the confidence ratings of the 
same 24 questions. All participants performing above the mean value on the 
choices (M  =  11.20, SD =2.60) and on the confidence ratings {M = —4.53, 
51) =  17.47) were coded as high achievers, and those performing below or 
equal to the mean values were coded as low achievers. In this way, it was 
possible to creatc two groups of participants, one consisting of high 
achievers with high accuracy and calibration, and another group of low 
achievers with low accuracy and calibration.
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Measures o f  the preference task. The sclccted alternatives were in both 
the conditions (the proccss tracing and the paper and pencil condition) for 
each participant and task assigned the score of 1 while the rejected alternatives 
were assigned the score of 0. No reactivity was found for the proccss tracing 
condition in the sense that ?-tests revealed that the mean response scores for a 
clear majority of the alternatives did not reliably differ between conditions.
Recoding o f the eye fixations data. In order to investigate whether high 
achievers used more compensatory decision strategies than low achievers, 
analyses of the Eyegaze recordings were made. Depth of search refers to the 
total amount of information that is searched (Ford, Schmitt, Schechtman, 
Hults, & Doherty, 1989; Klayman, 1983; Payne, 1976; Svenson, 1979). In the 
present experiment, only depth of search was used to examine whether 
participants used compensatory or noncompensatory decision strategies, 
due to limitations in the Eyegaze recorder’s processing software. Another 
strategy measure used in the present study was the participants’ response 
latency time (in ms).
A mean value of latency time for each attribute in ms was constructed. Each 
attribute was measured eight times since there was a total of eight problems for 
which each of the attributes could be attended to  in each problem. A second 
mean value of the four profit attributes and a third mean value of the four 
environmental attributes were likewise constructed (both in ms).
The time required to acquire information using eye fixations varies 
between 200 ms and 400 ms (Card, Moran, & Newell, 1983; Russo, 1978). 
An index was therefore constructed based upon the mean value (300 ms) of 
these two endpoints. All the participant’s attention that required less than 
300 ms upon an attribute was coded as 0, whereas if it required more than 
300 ms it was coded as 1. Summing the four profit attributes (now recodcd 
as 1 or 0) that participants had been attending to, a measure indicating the 
number of attributes that had received attention was created. This ranged 
from 0 to 4. The same procedure was used to construct another measure for 
the four environmental attributes (also recodcd as 1 or 0). In this way, it was 
possible to investigate the degree to which participants focused upon profit 
or environmental attributes.
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RESULTS 
The presentation mode of uncertainty
High achievers were expected to be less affectcd than low achievers by 
whether the information was probability or frequency based. A 2 (group: high 
achicvers vs. low achievers) x 2 (condition: probability-based vs. frequency- 
bascd information) x 2 (attributes: profit vs. environmental attributes) mixed
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor performed on the number 
of attributes yielded a significant main effect of attributes, F (l,  64) =8.63, 
/? < .01, M SE  = 6.55. This effect again confirmed that participants searched 
for more information concerning profit goals than concerning environmental 
goals. A main effect of group was also found, F ( l ,  64) =5.04,/) < .05, M SE  = 
15.26, revealing that high achievers attended to the attributes reliably more 
than low achievers. Separate Bonferonni-corrected /-tests 'ii p  = .05 per­
formed on the high achievers revealed that no significant differences existed 
between the probability- or frcqucncy-based information conditions regard­
ing the time spent on searching for information concerning the two types of 
attributes or conccrning the number of attendance paid to these. There were 
no significant differences between high achievers in the probability- or 
frequency-based conditions for any of the single profit or environmental 
attributes. In line with this, low achievers showed no significant differences in 
the time spent on the environmental or on the profit attributes. However, 
whether or not low achievers had been searching for information about an 
attribute was found to have some effects on the time used. Additional 
separate Bonferonni-corrected /-tests at /? =  .05 revealed that low achievers’ 
search for information conccrning some of the attributes (the profit attribute 
of improved share of the market, and the environmental attributes of 
improved energy saving, decreased effluent level, and improved working 
environment) differed in the frequency- and probability-based information 
conditions. Evidently, in the majority of these cases low achievers revealed a 
reliably higher value for searches of probability-based information, but one 
cffcct was in the other direction. The results therefore suggest that qualitative 
differences may exist in the cognitive processes applied by low performers 
depending on the nature of the attribute/dimension. Table 1 shows the mean 
percentages of low achievers’ searches for information for the above- 
mentioned attributes. The other environmental and profit attributes, as well 
as the number of environmental or profit attributes that were searched for 
revealed no significant differences between the two conditions.
Bonferonni-corrected /-tests at /j =  .05 on the preference data confirmed 
Hypothesis 1. As shown in Table 2, low achievers differed significantly 
between the frequency- and probability-based information groups. Such a 
difference was not observed for the high achievers.
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The decision heuristic test
High achievers were expected to use more compensatory decision strategies 
when processing information than low achievers. Table 3 shows the mean 
numbers of attributes attended to by type of goal for high and low achievers. 
As can be seen, high achievers searched for the information by using more
TABLE 1
Mean values (scale ranging from 0 to 1) of high and low achievers' searches of 
attributes and f-test effects for participants in the frequency- and probability-based
infornnatlon conditions
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Attributes Prohahilities Frequencies Effects
Low achievers
Improved productivity .25 0,01 /(24 )=  1.25,/>=,22
Increased sales .42 0.50 i(24)== -  0.41,/) =.69
Improved share of the market .25 0.00 <(24)==2.08,/) <.05
Improved profit .25 0.21 1(24)-= 0.21,/)=.84
Improved environmental policy .(K) 0.01 f(24)= 0.92, p =.31
Improved energy saving .25 0.00 /(24)==2.08, p  <.05
Decreased effluent level .25 0.00 /(24 )=  2.08,/) <.05
Improved working environment .00 0.29 i(24)=  -2 .1 0 ,/)  <.05
High achicvcrs
Improved productivity .48 0.33 <(40) =0.93, =.36
Increased sales .38 0.38 i(40) =0.00,/) =  1.00
Improved share of the market .43 0,33 i(40) ==0.62,/) =.54
Improved profit ,33 0.48 i(40) == -0 .9 3 ,/)  =.36
Improved environmental policy .19 0,14 f(40) ==0.41,/) =.69
Improved energy saving .48 0.33 i(40)=0 .93 ,/)= .36
Decreased etiluent level .48 0.33 /(40) ==0.93,/) =.36
Improved working environment .24 0.24 r(40) == 0.00,/) =  1.00
attributes than did low achievers. A 2 (group: high achievers vs. low 
achievers) x 2 (attributes; profit vs. environmental attributes) mixed ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the last factor performed on the number of 
attributes yielded a significant main effect of attributes, F (l, 55) =4.97, p < 
.05, M SE  = 3J0. This effect revealed that participants searched for more 
information concerning profit goals than environmental goals. A main cffect 
of group was also found, /"(I, 55) =5.30, p < .05, M SE  = 530. In line with 
the expectations this effect showed that high achievers attended to more 
attributes than did low achievers. Separate Bonferonni-corrected i-tests at
TABLE 2
Mean percentages (scale 0 -100) and t-test effects of high and low achieving 
participants' choices by groups of alternatives
Choices o f  amdiilaies ProhabiHiies Frequencies Effects N
Low achicvcrs
Profitnwx alternatives 60.2 49.9 /(90) = 2 .5 6 ,< .0 5  96
Environ,,,;,X alternatives 39.8 50.1 i(90) =  — 2 .5 0 ,< .0 5  96
High achievers
Profit„,i„ alternatives 58.4 53.2 i(90) =  1.15,;; =.25 96
Environ,,,ax alternatives 41.6 46.8 /(90) =  -1.12,/> =.27 96
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TABLE 3
Mean values of number of attributes attended to (scale 
0 -4 ) by type of goal for high and low achievers
Number o f  attributes
Profit goals Environmental goals
High achicvens 1.44 1.15
Low achicvcrs 0.83 0.34
/) =  .05 revealed that this difference was reliable for the environmental 
attributes, /(66) =2.67, p < .05, but not for the profit attributes.
Table 4 reveals the mean values (in ms) for time spent on the attributes by 
type of goal for high and low achicvers. Another 2 (group: high achievers vs. 
low achievers) x 2 (attributes: profit vs. environmental attributes) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor performed on the time 
spent on searchmg the attributes resulted in a significant main effect of 
attributes, F (l, 55) =5.52, p < .05, M S E =9.03. Again it was revealed that 
participants attended more to profit attributes than to environmental 
attributes. However, the main effect of group did not reach significance, 
F (l, 55) =3.30,/? =  .074, A/Sii =  10.03. Separate Bonferonni-corrected t- 
tests at /) =  .05 showed that participants searched the profit attribute 
information significantly more often than they searched the environmental 
attribute information, /(77)=3.03, <.01. Furthermore, high achicvers 
were found to reveal a tendency to attend more to the environmental 
attributes as compared to low achievers, /(66) =2.67, p  =  .069. No sig­
nificant differences were found for the time attended to the profit attributes.
DISCUSSION
The results revealed that participants performing well on heuristics tasks 
(availability, representativeness, anchoring and adjustment, attribution) and 
on confidcnce judgement tasks also behaved quite accurately in the 
fulfilment of preference tasks.
TABLE 4
Mean values of time spent on the attributes (in ms) 
by type of goal for high and low  achievers
Time spent on the attributes
Profit goals Environmental goals
High achievers 1615 774
Low achievcrs 721 406
Hypothesis 1
For instance, it was revealed that the high performers were not as influenced 
as the low performers by whether uncertainty was presented in terms of 
probabilities or in terms of frequencies. Moreover, the high performers spent 
a more equal amount of time between the two conditions (probability/ 
frequency) searching for information, compared with the low performers. 
Also, the high performers were not to the same extent biased by the 
conditions (probability/frequency) in their preferences for any of the groups 
of alternatives compared with the low performers. This seems particularly to 
have been the case with people who were performing below the average on 
decision heuristic and confidence judgement tasks. All these re.sults support 
recent dual-processes accounts on thinking revealing that there exist 
individual differences in rational thought on a quite general basis (Evans 
& Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 1997,1998, 2000). They also 
give some support to the frequentist view (Gigerenzer, 1991, 1993, 1994) in 
the sense that a frequency format not only matters for performance in 
decision heuristic tasks but also for confidence judgement tasks. Addition­
ally, the fact that performance on decision heuristics and confidence 
judgement tasks had a bearing on performance on multiattribute choice 
tasks corroborates the validity of previous research on decision heuristics 
(Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Tvcrsky & Kahneman, 
1974). It is hereby also suggested that heuristic thinking may be able to 
explain the different information search behaviour observed between the two 
groups with regard to presentation format.
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Hypothesis 2
Furthermore, it was shown that high performers invested more time in 
searching for information than did low performers (Evans & Over, 1996; 
Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 1997, 1998, 2000). It was also established 
that high performers investigated more attributes in their search for 
information in comparison with low performers. All these results suggest 
that the ability to reason in a logically and statistically correct way, 
combined with good self-calibration, clearly has an impact on the extent 
to which people use optimal decision strategies in multiattribute decision 
situations (Vcrschueren et al., 2004). The findings therefore add credit to the 
opinion that accurate decision behaviour may be determined by choice of 
decision strategies (the weighted additive strategy being used as a normative 
yardstick for accurate decision behaviour; see Payne et al., 1993). Hereby, it 
is suggested that analytical thinking also plays an important role for the 
observed differences between the two groups.
Limitations
In the present study, we have, in line vi'ith Payne ct al. (1993), focuscd on 
preferences, such as between hypothetical job  candidates, rather than on 
inferences about the real world, such as which soccer team will win or which of 
two cities is larger. This procedure has been criticised by Gigerenzer, Todd, and 
The ABC Group (1999). They claim that it is difficult with such a procedure to 
measure the accuracy of strategics in terms of their ability to predict rcal-world 
outcomes. Instead, such a procedure restricts itself to measure accuracy by 
how closely a strategy can match the predictions of a weighted additive rule, 
which is the traditional gold standard for rational preferences. According to 
Gigerenzer ct al., fast and frugal heuristics may actually sometimes outper­
form strategies built on systematic weighting and utility maximisation. It 
should also be mentioned that Gigerenzer (1991, 1993, 1994) stresses the use 
of frequencies in a natural sampling framework (i.e., “natural frequencies”), 
which would entail the frequencies of candidates that achieve particular goals, 
nested within frequencies of candidates that achieve other particular goals. 
The results of the present study are still generally supportive of the Gigerenzer 
et al. paradigm, because they propose that frequencies are more generally a 
format with which the mind is better able to work.
On the other hand, it may be inferred that there are validity problems tied 
to the ecological perspective on accuracy presented by Gigerenzer et al. 
(1999). For instance, it may be the case that the most well-known stocks are 
those best at predicting financial success on the market in good times, but 
that this fact may be altered in times of market crisis.
DECISION HEURISTICS, OVERCONFIDENCE, AND CHOICE 449
Practical innplications
It is evident to Gigerenzer (2002) that statistics arc often presented in highly 
confusing ways, but that our difficulty in thinking about numbers can easily 
be overcome. With a few helpful techniques we can loam to uncloud our 
minds, demand helpfully presented information and turn ignorance into 
insight. In this respect, the choice of presentation format plays an extremely 
important role. It has been revealed in, for instance, both medical 
diagnostics and legal practice, that the way vital information is presented 
has a bearing on judgements and decisions. Here, the knowledge that 
presentation format (frequencies/probabilities) has different impact on 
decision-making behaviour for high-performing vs. low-performing ra­
tional-thinking groups is a new important fact for practitioners. Also the 
fact that performance on rational thinking has an impact on information 
search behaviour in multiattributc choice situations is a result that is highly 
important for real-world applications.
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Future research
A question that remains to be addressed in future research is whether high 
performers are doing better on the nonfrequency tasks because (a) they are 
using “Systcm2” procedures and thus directly are making normatively 
correct inferences, or (b) they are better at mentally converting the stimuli to 
alternative formats (e.g., frequency) formats and then applying appropriate 
“Systeml” procedures. PrEview proof published online month/year
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APPENDIX
An example o f  a multiple events inform ation scenario given lo participants in the select conditions with probability-based inform ation
Imagine that you as an outside consu ltan t arc going to  choose am ong eight different groups o f  candidates applying for a post in an inform ation 
division in a chemical company. The eight different groups o f  candidates differ in the degree to  which they can be expected to prom ote certain 
aim s that the company has. The candidate groups’ ability to achieve these aims is expressed on a scale ranging from I to  100%. We w ant you to 
select tlie four best groups o f  candidates who will progress to  an interview. As an outside consultant you do not have to justify your decision to 
others and the identity o f decision-m akers will in the company remain anonymous.
Groups o f 
camlidales
Decreased 
ejfluenc level
Improved share 
o f  Ihe market
Increased
sales
Impproved 
working 
emiromnen t
Improved
emiromnenta!
policy
Improved 
energy saving
Improved
productivity
Improved
profit
Group D 60% 50% 60“/ . 40% 40% 50% 50% 50%
Group A 20'% 20% 30“/o 80% 30% 80% 80% 90%
Group E 70% 70% 80“/ . 20% 80% 30% 30“/. 30%
Group B 80“/ . 30% 90“/ . 30% 70% 20% 70% 30%
Group F 80% 70% 20“/ . 70% 30% 20% 90% 20%
Group C 40“/ . 50»/. 40“/ . 50% 50% 60% 60% 60%
Group G 40% 40% 50% 50% 50% 60% 60'K. 50%
Group H 50“/ . 40'Vi. 60“/ . 40% 50% 60% 50“/. 60%
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Which four candidates do you sclect?
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